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UNSAFE ACTS AND UNSAFE CONDITIONS: 
DEVELOPMENT OF A PRELUDE MODEL 
Fred Sherratt1, Simon D Smith2 and David Oswald2 
1 Anglia Ruskin University, Bishop Hall Lane, Chelmsford, CM1 1SQ 
2 University of Edinburgh, King’s Buildings, West Mains Road, Edinburgh, EH9 3JN, UK 
Construction safety management has long utilised the concepts of unsafe acts and 
unsafe conditions within incident and accident reporting processes.  Unsafe acts are 
often considered to be the greater concern; with figures of approximately 80-90% of 
accidents attributed to unsafe worker behaviour, although unsafe conditions remain 
relevant.  It has also been argued that both play a part in safety, as manifest in highly 
complex accident causation models, yet industry often remains reliant on the 
simplistic categorisations of acts/conditions within accident reporting processes and 
safety observations undertaken in practice.  This utility and common practice must be 
recognised, and it can be suggested that acts and conditions are firmly interlinked.  
Drawing on a large dataset of nearly 4,000 Safety Observation Reports from a large 
infrastructure construction project, investigation of the way in which incidents are 
categorised is explored and then, via content analysis of a purposive sample of 
individual reports, the reality of how the acts and conditions combine and interrelate 
is evaluated.  Findings revealed significant inconsistency in the application of the 
categorisations of act or condition, and utilisation of the process to apportion 
individual blame through ‘unsafe acts’.  Grounded in the data, a conceptual model is 
developed that recognises the state of ‘unsafety’ of both acts and conditions, but also 
explores the preludes to both.  It can be suggested that within the construction context 
there are relatively few precursors that produce unsafe acts or conditions in practice, 
and employing these in practice would provide greater insights, enhancing utility 
without adding significant complexity.  Integration of this model within the reporting 
process would enable management to better use reporting data in the development and 
implementation of focused interventions, albeit still grounded in the familiar unsafe 
acts and unsafe conditions identified on their projects. 
Keywords: safety observations, unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, taxonomies 
INTRODUCTION 
The historical development of occupational health and safety management in 
construction has in part dictated its lexicon.  Early focus was on the identification and 
mitigation of physical risks within the workplace, through the provision of machine 
guards and controls (Lingard and Rowlinson 2005) which led to prescriptive 
management approaches which focused on unsafe conditions through mechanistic 
regulations. Subsequently, as the number of accidents decreased focus shifted onto 
unsafe acts, through approches such as behaviour-based safety (Lingard and 
Rowlinson 2005), goals and feedback programmes, and most recently notions of 
safety climate and culture have emerged (Choudhry et al 2007). 
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A consequence of this language of safety is the way it has directed thinking, 
particularly in the areas of safety reporting for accidents and near-misses, towards 
unsafe acts or unsafe conditions as an either/or situation.  However, accidents are 
often highly complex in reality, and to use such a simplistic dichotomy in reporting 
and subsequent investigation is likely to limit the learning potential of an incident.  
Indeed, although acts have come to the fore in terms of management focus, evidence 
has shown that organisational factors are indeed critical (Lingard and Rowlinson 
2005); whilst Hinze (1996) argued that it is always a combination of physical 
conditions and worker actions that is the true cause of safety accidents on sites. 
Despite such evidence, unsafe acts and unsafe conditions often remain segregated in 
practice, accident and near miss reporting seeking to categorise one or the other, with 
no potential for overlap.  Academic advances in accident analysis have led to the 
development of ever more complex approaches, grounded in systems thinking and 
organisational failure models, yet their utility has been questioned (Hovden et al 
2010).  Indeed they are rarely used in practice, and would be challenging to apply to 
near-miss reporting, which is often large scale in terms of volume, but with relatively 
little management time available to record, analyse and act upon them. 
Drawing on a large database of nearly 4,000 safety observation reports that have been 
categorised as either unsafe acts or unsafe conditions, this work seeks to explore 
empirically the consequences of this dualistic approach, and how acts and conditions 
combine in practice.  It reflects on the utility of this approach to practice, and how it 
can form the basis of a simpler ‘prelude model’ of safety. 
CONTEXT 
Unsafe Conditions and Unsafe Acts, and more Systemic Thinking 
Early health and safety management was grounded in the elimination of unsafe 
working conditions, indeed the earliest UK safety legislation sought to address the 
mechanistic problems of exposed mill-gearing in the factories of the industrial 
revolution.  Developments in technology brought new hazards and risks into 
workplaces, and key concerns were to  “… find the technical means to safeguard 
machinery, to stop explosions and to prevent structures from collapsing” (Hollnagel 
2014:24).  Within the UK construction industry, unsafe conditions are often addressed 
through rigorous legislation, such as that found within Part 4 of the Construction 
(Design and Management) Regulations 2007, which sets out amongst other things 
how stability of structures must be maintained, how excavations must be managed and 
how good order can be kept on sites. 
Alongside such unsafe conditions, relating to the work space, can be found the 
concept of unsafe acts, relating to the behaviour of the people who work there.  As 
Hollnagel (2014:30) states, “the idea that human error could be used to explain the 
occurrence of adverse events was eagerly adopted”.  Application of cognitive theories 
also enables ‘explanation’ of such unsafe acts, examples including the optimism bias, 
that everything will go right despite risks being taken, the overconfidence barrier, and 
the planning fallacy, which results in optimistic predictions about how long a task will 
take (Baron et al 2006) which can result in cutting corners and risk taking when 
deadlines approach.  More generally, Kletz (2001) suggested that most unsafe acts 
were the result of a moments forgetfulness or aberration, others the result of errors of 
judgement, which can also be traced back to inadequate training or supervision.  
Within the construction industry, Rawlinson and Farrell (2010) observe that a high 
tolerance to risk taking is evident, allowing intentional unsafe acts to form part of 
everyday site life. 
A combined approach is to make technology failsafe so unsafe acts cannot not lead to 
an accident, rather than educate workers through training programmes (Swuste et al 
2014), however this is highly problematic within the construction industry, given the 
nature of the work.  Indeed, the continuing development of technology within the 
workplace has led to increasing complexity and coupling between tasks and activities, 
therefore interactions cannot be fully planned, understood or anticipated (Leveson 
2004).  This is particularly relevant when many different subcontractors and long 
supply chains create complex relationships on sites, and have been found to have 
negative effects on safety (Manu et al 2010).  Although single failure prevention is 
often built in to processes and equipment, this means that in practice accidents have 
shifted to more complicated occurrences with two or more cumulative failures, which 
are harder to predict and therefore harder to prevent. (Hollnagel 2004:3). 
These ideas of organisational failure (Hollnagel 2004; Hovden et al 2010) and 
systemic safety (Dekker 2006) bring together unsafe acts and conditions.  Unsafe acts 
have become a symptom of deeper latent problems within projects or organisations, 
the management system creating situations, or rather unsafe conditions that can 
encourage or even force human errors within certain contexts (Perrow 1999; Dekker 
2006).  As Whittingham (2004:34) states, most violations (unsafe acts) also have a 
systemic underlying cause that effectively ‘encourages’ them.  Within the construction 
industry competitive tendering for work winning (Morton and Ross 2008); and bonus 
and payment schemes that encourage speed and risk taking behaviours (Fellows et al 
2002; Spanswick 2007) have both been highlighted as unsafe conditions, or latent 
safety defects, in industry operations.  However, as Whittingam (2004) argues, 
organisations are often unwilling to look too closely at the system faults which caused 
the error, and would rather focus on the individual who caused it; emphasising the 
unsafe act rather than the systemic cause. 
On construction sites, where the workplace is subject to continual changes, different 
resources, poor working conditions, tough environments and complex co-ordination of 
different trades and subcontractors (Pinto et al 2011), performance variability can be 
argued to be a necessity, therefore to isolate and label unsafe acts within such 
(potentially unsafe) conditions seems incongruous.  However, this has not stopped 
continued focus on unsafe acts, embedded as they are in the historical language of 
safety.  Indeed, both acts and conditions, independently and combined in systems 
thinking, still hold significant influence on the way accidents, incidents and near 
misses are investigated both academically and in practice. 
The Influences of Accident and Incident Investigation 
Statistics form one of the most prominent safety indicators of an industry, providing 
evidence of safety management in practice.  Accident statistics are themselves lagging 
indicators (Hinze et al 2013), and learning from past indicators is a key process for 
understanding why accidents occur on sites and how future performance can be 
improved (Manu et al 2010).  Yet investigations of accident causality have developed 
highly complex, and at times rather unfathomable, approaches to investigating 
incidents from a variety of underlying theories and approaches.  Indeed, Grabowski et 
al noted the panoply of approaches, and that there have been “ … few efforts to 
harmonise or synthesise the models and methods” (2009, p1187), resulting in an 
incoherent body of work. The accident process itself has also seen development from 
linear, causal models, which suggest accidents are simply the sequential result of 
technical factors, human error or organisational problems (Hovden et al 2010), to 
more complex, integrated approaches.  As Grabowski et al (2009) note, whilst some 
accidents will be the result of immediate causes, cascading through an error chain, 
others are much more complex with non-linear interdependencies, drawing on systems 
thinking for their theoretical foundation. 
One of the main goals of accident investigation has been the identification of the ‘root 
cause’, and consequently the apportioning of blame (Whittingham 2004).  Accidents 
are seen as evidence of error or failure, through either an unsafe act or the emergence 
of an unsafe condition, and therefore accident investigation becomes the quest to 
identify the responsible individual behind the error (Dekker 2011).  It can be argued 
that this has perpetuated ‘human error’ as a prominent causal factor in accidents 
(Whittingham 2004), as the cause becomes easily identifiable as one of Reason’s 
(1990) rule, skill and knowledge-based errors or occasional or routine violations.  Yet 
the quest for root causes has been challenged on a variety of levels, not least the 
potential for over-simplification (Grabowski et al 2009).  Kletz (2001) suggested that 
root cause has an air of finality about it, not always helpful, given that the cause of 
many accidents is actually gravity.  Hollnagel (2004) suggested that causes are not 
sought simply for learning, but from desires for certainty, and the notion we gain 
knowledge that can be used in future accident prevention.   
Systemic, management and organisational factors have also been identified and 
incorporated into accident thinking.  For example, Hollnagel (2004) proposed a 
Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) based on the concepts of emergence.  
Ferjencik (2011) discussed the notions of singular causality, general causality, 
contextual factors, contributory factors and causal factors in the development of an 
Integrated Procedure of Incident Cause Analysis (IPICA).  Leveson (2004:257) went 
further than organisational boundaries in suggesting a general form of a model of 
socio-technical control which also acknowledges the influences of legislation, 
regulations, certifications, and law. 
From the utilitarian perspective, the shift to systemic and organisational thinking has 
added considerable complexity to the process of accident and incident investigation.  
Although it is arguable that a contextual understanding of an accident is a vital part of 
its investigation, in order to appreciate the social and technical systems that 
surrounded it (Leveson 2004) and enable the development of explanations, rather than 
isolated root causes (Hollngel 2004), it has been questioned whether they have seen 
utilisable fit with the current, existing realities of work (Hovden et al 2010).  There is 
the potential for the level of detail and the interactions of these details to develop 
incoherence and impracticality, as they increase in numbers and interrelationships.  
Indeed, it has been suggested that this increasing complexity is incompatible within 
traditional linear accident models and whether new approaches are needed (Hovden et 
al 2010), exploring non-linear perspectives (Ferjencik 2011).  This may however raise 
its own problems, as the representations and communication of such approaches may 
prove too complex to practically deliver. 
Indeed, uptake of complex approaches to investigation has been limited, or only 
utilised when serious incidents, such as fatalities, occur.  The need for investigation to 
support learning, the human desire for categorisation and management, and the desire 
to apportion blame where necessary, has arguably resulted in the reliance on two 
fundamental root causes; unsafe act and unsafe conditions.  Therefore, rather than 
seek complexity, it is this basic approach that should be empirically explored to 
ascertain its benefits and limitations, whilst enabling consideration of the relationships 
between these two root causes.  In taking a utilitarian perspective, and accepting of the 
desire to retain simplicity and ease of use on sites, it is hoped that a theoretical model 
can be produced which fits with the site context, yet is able to inform improvements in 
accident reporting and learning on sites. 
METHODS 
Between March 2013 and July 2014, 3956 safety observation reports were collected 
from a large UK infrastructure construction project (approximate value £800M). The 
collection of safety observations from construction personnel is common practice on 
large projects, and for this dataset any manager or foreman was able to enter details in 
to an online system for the attention of the safety department. The person entering the 
report categorised it initially as a type of ‘observation’, either an ‘Unsafe Act’ or an 
‘Unsafe Condition’ or as an example of ‘Good Practice’, and subsequently this 
observation was allocated to one of 27 different work ‘categories’. A project safety 
advisor ‘checked’ this categorisation, and could amend it if necessary, potentially 
dismissing it as a non-safety issue, or authorising it for further action. 
A mixed methods approach has been used with these data.  Quantitative analysis was 
carried out to initially determine the allocation of observations, and then to establish 
the relative quantifications of the ascribed categories beneath them.  While a full 
content analysis of all the safety observations would reveal more about the actual 
practices and nature of activities that resulted in the safety report, it is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Therefore a qualitative approach was made to just two categories, 
considered a purposive sample, which could then be examined in depth, utilising 
content analysis (Tonkiss 2004) to develop a taxonomy of the data.  A taxonomy can 
reveal the principles underlying a classification, for example Garrett and Teizer (2009) 
provided a taxonomy for human error awareness in construction safety.  Repeated 
passes of the data enabled the researchers to explore the data itself and also undertake 
a process of re-framing, exploring the potential for alternative categorisations than 
those originally made, through the lens of the literature. 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Quantitative Analysis 
Of the 3956 safety observation reports, 2128 were categorised as unsafe conditions, 
697 as unsafe acts and 1131 as good practice.  Here only ‘unsafety’ is considered and 
therefore the ‘good practice’ observations were removed from the dataset, resulting in 
2825 records.  With just over 75% of the observations considered to be unsafe 
conditions these data can be considered surprising – they imply that the majority of 
unsafe incidents are derived from situations that are not influenced by human actions.  
However, this may also be a reflection of the difficulties of observing fluid and 
momentary acts when compared to static and unchanging conditions. 
A fuller picture of the dataset and of the range of categories to which the reports had 
been ascribed can be found in Figure 1, which presents graphically the range of 
categories as assigned beneath the observations of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions. 
In almost all categories it can be seen that the number of unsafe conditions exceeds 
the number of unsafe acts, with the exception of ‘behaviour’.  The inclusion of this 
category in itself is interesting – it is neither a work type (such as excavations or 
lifting) nor an organisational function (such as permits, PPE or welfare).  That there 
are any ‘unsafe conditions’ that can be attributed to behaviour is also interesting and 
the data overall suggests either misunderstanding in the categorisation of the safety 
observations, or is the manifestation of the complexities of incident reporting when 
limited to just categorisations.  
 
Figure 1: Categorisation of Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Conditions 
Qualitative Analysis 
In order to further explore the data, and these apparent inconsistencies, the cases under 
the ‘behaviour’ category for both unsafe acts and unsafe conditions, were extracted 
from the wider dataset, a total of n= 114 records. 
The process of this analysis was revealing in itself. In the initial dataset, 48 
observations were recorded as unsafe conditions but many of these did not fall under a 
definition of situations that were unsafe through non-immediate human means.  For 
example, one report suggested that “Welder welding without screen in internal stair” 
was an unsafe condition, presumably because the correct equipment was not present, 
but in the researchers’ interpretation the lack of a screen in a particular area should not 
be the immediate focus; rather the fact that the welder chose to continue welding 
without a screen present is itself poor human judgement and thus an unsafe act.  This 
consideration of ‘human means’ was used as a ‘benchmark’ for classification, while at 
the same time acknowledging it is arguable that any classification process is 
inherently subject to interpretation, as demonstrated by the data explored here:  
overall, of the 48 initial such observations only 5 remained as such following the re-
framing process; 90% were changed by the researchers.  This finding illustrates the 
complexities involved in deciding at what point an act, or number of acts, eventually 
ossifies into a condition. 
However, those observations that remained ‘unsafe conditions’ following the re-
framing process were still supported by the sub-categorisation of behaviour.  Here, 
and to further develop the previous argument, the underlying premise was that an act 
had initiated the condition, although the line between them had been drawn at the 
level of the categorisation rather than the observation.  For example, the observation 
that “road pins for gulley setting out have no protection either place caps or remove 
pins”, can be related to behaviour, or rather the omission of the behaviour to place 
caps on the pins, but it could also relate specifically to excavation works.  Although 
this analysis arguably supports more complex, non-linear and emergent approaches to 
analysing safety incidents, given the reliance on acts and conditions it can be 
suggested that what would actually be of greater utility would be a clearly defined and 
shared understanding of the ‘line’ between acts and consequentially emergent 
conditions, integrating this concept of behaviour within it. 
Another notable aspect of the data, revealed by the analytical process was the 
prominence of finger pointing or blaming individuals for their behaviour.  For 
example “Safety rep parking vehicle in live traffic route to speak to his supervisor”; 
“Security guard not using walkways, challenged and re-routed to walkway” are clearly 
identifying individuals with some level of authority.  While many unsafe act 
observations report simply the behaviour of an unidentified individual, 37% directly 
identify the individual by name or by the company they work for or by the registration 
number of their vehicle.  Such data strongly indicates highly complex social and 
organisational issues at play that have seeped into the safety observation process, in 
part those who create and enforce the policies are readily punished by others for their 
violation.  Even where individuals are not named, the desire to lay blame can be found 
within the data, a fundamental need in incident reporting as identified by Whittingham 
(2004) and Dekker (2011). 
 
Figure 2: A taxonomy of the Behaviour category of safety observations 
The prepared taxonomy itself, seen in graphical form in Figure 2, was also of interest; 
both behavioural acts and conditions easily assigned to either policy, procedural or 
equipment categorisations, suggesting that a more useful assignment could be made at 
a more ‘detailed’ level within the data, rather than the traditional act/condition 
dichotomy.  As the taxonomy developed, ‘deliberate’ and ‘inadvertent’ also emerged 
as key categorisations, deliberate further supported by notions of ‘shortcuts’ and 
deliberate violations of procedure.   
In order to provide a ‘check’ on the findings from the ‘behavioural’ categorisation 
data, a taxonomy was also prepared for the ‘hot works’ category. This was a much 
smaller sub-set of the data (n = 22 reports that were either unsafe act or unsafe 
condition), yet the same taxonomy categories emerged from this data.  The only 
category present in hot works but not in behaviour was ‘missing equipment’.  This is 
itself of interest, as it could be suggested that equipment has developed beyond its 
inherent unsafety, the initial causes behind historical concerns around unsafe 
conditions (Hollnagel 2014), and rather it is unsafe acts involving this equipment that 
have become more relevant to practice.  The taxonomy for hot works can be seen in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: A taxonomy of the Hot Works category of safety observations 
In the preparatory process of this second taxonomy, similar observations were made 
as for the behaviour category.  Reports again appeared to be incorrectly categorised as 
unsafe condition when could be more appropriately labelled unsafe act (50% were 
changed) and those that identified individuals or companies and could be considered 
‘blame reports’ (27%), though both were not to the same extent as for ‘behaviour’. 
THE PRELUDE MODEL  
The ease with which the same levels were identified in the preparation of both 
taxonomies suggest there may be a common pattern to how unsafety can be 
understood, in terms of preludes rather than ‘root causes’ (Grabowski et al 2009).  
Generally, equipment and procedures can be identified in level 2; poor execution in 
level 3; inadvertent or deliberate at level 4 with either shortcuts or wrong choice of 
procedure at level 5. By reversing these levels, a tentative ‘prelude model’ of unsafety 
development emerges. 
These ideas are explored in Figure 4, a conceptual prelude model of unsafety 
development between unsafe acts and unsafe conditions. 
 
Figure 4:   The development of unsafety – a conceptual model 
CONCLUSIONS 
Through content analysis of 136 Safety Observation Reports taken from a larger 
dataset of nearly 4000, a greater understanding of the nature of unsafety as perceived 
by those undertaking construction work emerges. The process of analysis revealed 
both complexities and subjectivity within the reporting process, and an underlying 
desire to apportion blame.  This raises questions of the motivation for creating reports; 
to point fingers, particularly at those in authority, or to genuinely attempt to improve 
conditions.  Projects and organisations undertaking safety reporting of this nature 
should seek to ensure this does not undermine the utility of the exercise. 
The categorisation of unsafe act and unsafe condition was found to be highly 
subjective, and likely dependent first on a robust definition of what constitutes an ‘act’ 
and what a ‘condition; and secondly on individuals’ interpretation of this definition.  
Many reported unsafe conditions were deemed by the researchers to actually be unsafe 
acts.  In some ways this is contrary to the conclusions of Whittingham (2004), who 
argues that organisations would rather focus on the error of the individual.  Yet the 
contextual descriptions of each observation challenge this further – while many 
clearly indicate human error, most unsafe acts were categorised as systemic 
conditions.  If such labels are to be used then clearer and objective definitions are 
needed for consistency of reporting, to mitigate the subjective nature of the process. 
Preparation of taxonomies on two subsets of the overall data enabled the development 
of a conceptual prelude model of how unsafe acts and unsafe conditions may develop 
and form.  The nature of how unsafety develops was very similar for both acts and 
conditions and rather than as two ends of a single spectrum, they are perhaps instead 
two artificial constructs superimposed on a development of unsafety, that has roots in 
decisions made either consciously or unconsciously; deliberately or inadvertently.  It 
is suggested that further research explore this prelude model in practice, including the 
utility of its application to existing reporting processes to ensure its ability to enhance, 
rather than over-complicate, existing industry reporting procedures. 
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